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NoSQL solutions have recently been gaining significant attention because they address some of 
the inefficiencies of traditional database management systems. NoSQL databases offer features 
such as performant distributed architecture, flexibility and horizontal scaling. Despite these 
advantages, there is a vast quantity of NoSQL systems available, which differ greatly from each 
other. The resulting lack of standardization of security features leads to a questionable maturity 
in terms of security. What is therefore much needed is a systematic lab research of the 
availability and maturity of the implementation of the most common standard database security 
features in NoSQL systems, resulting in a NoSQL security map. This paper summarizes the first 
part of our research project trying to outline such a map. It documents the definition of the 
standard security features to be investigated as well as the security research and results for the 
most commonly used NoSQL systems. 
Keywords: database security, NoSQL database systems, NoSQL security, database 
authentication, database authorization, database encryption 
1. Introduction 
Relational database management systems represent a mature technology for data management. 
They exist since the 1970s and are based on the solid scientific fundamentals of the relational 
data model developed by Edgar F. Codd. This maturity is expressed by the fact that apart from 
the core functionality, numerous complementary features are supported as part of the out of the 
box solutions of well-known commercial and open source database management systems.  
The topic of security is an example for this situation. In fact, big commercial vendors 
provide some of their most sophisticated security solutions as add-ons to their standard products 
(e.g. Oracle Advanced Security). Yet it is possible to identify a range of out of the box security 
features, which might be available for any well-known relational database product. 
NoSQL database management systems are designed to cope with the challenges of data 
management in the era of big data. They are specialized on horizontal scalability by providing 
partition tolerant distributed data processing. Thus, they have become the standard database 
technology for cloud applications [20]. According to the CAP theorem they have to trade these 
advantages for reduced consistency and ACID compliance [22]. NoSQL database management 
systems replace the traditional static relational database model for dynamic and flexible simple 
data models. This results in four major categories of such database systems: Document oriented 
stores, key value stores, wide column stores and graph databases [9].  
NoSQL is a young technology compared to relational systems; its market is highly 
competitive and fragmented. There are over 225 different database implementations [8]. Thus, 
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it is obvious to expect that many vendors invest their resources into features they get significant 
attention for: performance and scalability. But what is the state of affair of out of the box 
security in the NoSQL world? It is our belief that an extensive map of the state of out of the 
box security of all major NoSQL systems is needed. This map must be created by practical lab 
research on availability and maturity of out of the box security features. Relying just on existing 
product documentation cannot replace profound security research. 
For practical reasons, the concept of out of the box availability of security seems to us of 
special importance. We expect that developers are willing to make use of out of the box security 
when creating systems based on new database technology. But it is doubtful whether they are 
willing to invest extra time and money for additional security add-ons, especially if they have 
low security awareness. We apply the same argument also to users and organizations working 
with NoSQL systems. 
Our research is organized as follows. Based on a literature review on the well-established 
field of standard database security we extract common security features of database security, 
whose availability and maturity we are going to investigate for NoSQL systems. We start our 
research with the most popular system from each of the four categories of NoSQL database 
systems as listed in [6]. Then we proceed by extending our security research to all additional 
systems listed in [6] as well as on further NoSQL technologies which are covered by relevant 
scientific publications. This paper discusses research and results of the first four systems we 
investigated, since research on further NoSQL database systems is still ongoing. 
At the end of this introduction we provide details on the database security features 
investigated, and the four systems chosen. There exists a high number of valuable sources on 
database security. Exemplarily, we mention Ron Ben Natan who proclaims in [15] that database 
security must be implemented as part of a defense-in-depth strategy, to make sure that even if 
multiple layers are compromised, no significant damage will occur. He does not focus on a 
specific database brand, but rather provides a general view on the topic. Knox provides 
recommendations and best-practice solutions on Oracle security in [13]. He covers the entire 
security circle, from authentication and authorization to fine-grained access control and 
encryption. This publication is an excellent source from which universally applicable security 
ideas are derived from product-specific Oracle features. Hassan A. Afyouni, instructor at 
several universities, consultant, author, corporate trainer and database architect, describes 
database hardening and security in [1]. The importance of the features mentioned in these 
publications is underlined by the vulnerability list [27] released by OWASP (Open Web 
Application Security Project). From the pool of literature on database security we extracted user 
administration, authorization, authentication, password security, securing communication, 
encryption, auditing and log management to be common out of the box security features to 
research for in NoSQL database systems. 
For the research conducted the following databases were selected: OrientDB 2.2.14 from 
the domain of graph databases, Redis 3.2 from the key-value databases, Cassandra 3.10. from 
the column-oriented databases and MongoDB 3.4.4. as an example of a document database. 
These systems represented the mostly used systems due to [6] at the time of our project start 
(this list is very volatile) except for OrientDB which we chose over Neo4j, because of its multi-
model capabilities. Neo4J was selected to be covered in the next set of candidates for the next 
research step in our ongoing project.  
2. Related work 
In the search for scientific publications on NoSQL security for the four systems we have chosen 
to start our research with, we found a majority of publications to cover MongoDB and 
Cassandra. An IEEE-Explore search for “MongoDB” and “Security” revealed 837 hits (full text 
search)/ 24 hits (metadata search). The same search for “Cassandra” provided a similar amount 
of results, although not all papers addressed the NoSQL database system Cassandra, for 
example [4] introduces a role-based trust management system of the same name. Redis and 
OrientDB on the other hand provide less than 10 results each for the same query. 
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In the following, we provide an overview over those papers describing scientific work 
related to our research. [25] describes adding data encryption to MongoDB by introducing a 
transparent middleware as an add-on. However, our focus is on out of the box security.  [23] 
provides remarks on out of the box MongoDB auditing and [11] briefly discusses missing 
security features after default installation. Concerning attacks, a NoSQL injection attack on 
MongoDB is studied in [12]. A detailed study on authentication, authorization, encryption and 
auditing of MongoDB can be found in [7], and a comparison of its security features with those 
of Oracle and MySQL is outlined by [24]. Both of these publications cover a good deal of 
standard out of the box security features, yet not all the features considered in our publication. 
Looking for research results for a fast-developing technology like NoSQL topicality has to be 
taken into consideration. Although [26] provides an interesting analysis of MongoDB security 
features, the version studied is long outdated. 
Considering Cassandra, [2] describes attacks using malicious Cassandra nodes. [29] 
provides Redis security add-ons for authentication, encryption and data to persist, while [28] 
investigates attacks on data integrity of key value stores like Redis. An investigation of NoSQL 
security (in detail authentication, authorization, configuration, encryption and auditing) for 
Cassandra, Redis and MongoDB (and additionally CouchDB, HBASE and Couchbase) can be 
found in [30]. This investigation already dates back to 2014 and does not cover additional topics 
like server security. Additionally, a systematic list of complete results for all the features and 
database systems is missing. At least it is a valuable source for getting a quick impression of 
the security features of certain NoSQL systems. 
To our best knowledge we have found no publication describing systematic lab research on 
a map of out of the box NoSQL security features. We also did not find any publication covering 
all of the four systems we started our research with combining them with the out of the box 
security feature set we based our research on. 
3. Research and results 
For each database implementation, a test setup was installed. Each implementation was 
examined hands-on for each of our selected security features. We investigated to which extent 
the features were available and if we could identify weaknesses. Then we compared our 
findings to the technologies documentation and informed the vendors in case of differences 
found. It is worth mentioning that all four vendors of the database systems examined give the 
security advice to use their solutions in trusted environments only. 
As default configurations are a potential source of security issues, special attention was 
bestowed upon them. In this context, it is worth noting that we mention default configurations 
in the following only if they had proven to be a problem.  
 
User administration 
We tested the database systems against their capabilities to flexibly create and configure users, 
inherit from other users and manage them centrally. Redis turned out to offer no form of user 
management, its developers had even discontinued a project that had attempted to add this 
feature in 2014 [17].  
Cassandra offers database roles that may represent a single user or a group of users for 
authentication and permission management. A client can identify using a role that has the login 
privilege upon connecting. Roles were introduced in Cassandra 2.2. Prior to that, authentication 
and authorization were based on the concept of a user. This means that creating a user is just 
another way of creating a role. The key difference is that roles can also be granted to each other. 
In this context we can think of them as groups, allowing related privileges to be bundled 
together by granting them to roles, which can in turn then be assigned to specific database users. 
The default super user should be disabled (revoking of the login permission), as it is a security 
risk. Figure 1 gives an example of roles in Cassandra with login option, superuser option and 
the salted password hash. 
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Fig. 1. Example of Cassandra roles (users) with option login and superuser and salted password hash 
MongoDB offers a built-in database user and database administration roles are provided for 
each database. It can be distinguished between database user roles (read, readWrite), database 
administration roles (e.g. dbOwner), backup and restoration roles (e.g. readWriteAnyDatabase) 
and superuser roles. With superuser roles one needs to be careful as they provide direct or 
indirect system-wide superuser access (e.g dbOwner when scoped to the admin database). A 
user can be deactivated only by revoking permissions on resources. 
During the setup of OrientDB, a set of default users is created in the configuration file. This 
is the only database which offers user management through the configuration file. It is strongly 
advised not to leave them in production because untrusted users could attempt to access the 
OrientDB server with the credentials of the default users. Roles can be assigned to users. 
Inheritance of permissions is possible. The default user types are: a server user, a database user 
and a system user. A server user can be configured in the configuration file and has permissions 
on server-related activities while a database user only has permissions and roles associated with 
that specific database. As mentioned above, three default users are created for each database: 
admin, reader and writer, with their default passwords being the admin, reader and writer. It is 
possible to activate and deactivate users. A system user is essentially a hybrid of a server user 
and a database user.  
 
Authorization  
Authorization determines whether an entity has the authority to access a resource. System and 
object privileges are coarse-grained security privileges while access to data tables is handled 
by fine-grained access control, also called row-level security. There is a commonly practiced 
security tenet that states that users can only access data which they have a “need to know”. Our 
research included testing the possibilities of assignment and inheritance of privileges as well as 
the handling of authorization in general. This contained using standard roles as available, 
creating custom roles, inheriting from roles, granting and revoking permissions and testing the 
limits of these permissions. 
In Redis authorization is not implemented due to the drawback of the added complexity as 
stated in [19]. In a classical setup, this means that in addition to modifying all data, the client 
could also control the server configuration (e.g. changing the working directory or writing dump 
files at random paths) using the config command. To limit clients to a specific set of commands 
[18] suggest command-level security through obscurity by allowing an administrator to rename 
commands into unguessable names or disabling them by setting the name to a blank string.  
Nevertheless, this does not limit access to data.   
Cassandra either allows any action to any user (default setting) or actions according to 
stored permissions. Permissions on database resources are granted to roles. Roles may be 
granted to other roles to create hierarchical permissions structures. In these hierarchies, 
permissions and superuser status are inherited. Contrary, the login privilege itself is not 
inheritable. Custom roles can also be created. It is recommended to disable the default 
superuser. 
By default, authorization is not enabled in MongoDB but access to data and commands can 
be granted through role-based authorization. Built-in roles provide different levels of access to 
the database system. It is also possible to create user-defined roles. A role can include existing 
roles in its definition and inherits all the privileges of the included role. To add a user-defined 
role, the scope must be given, as inheritance is only possible from roles within this scope. 
To restrict unauthorized users and possible attackers from giving themselves privileges on 
the OrientDB server or read configuration parameters, read and write access to the configuration 
file and the entire config directory should be disabled. Roles can inherit permissions from other 





Authentication is needed to securely identify a certain entity, which means it must provide proof 
to the server that it is who it is claiming to be. Security flaws resulting from default 
configurations were a topic already at the 2013 DEF CON, one of the world’s largest hacker 
conventions. Ming Chow, a senior lecturer at Tufts University Department of Computer 
Science, described default values as easy prey for attackers. All they need to know is the 
database vendor, an IP address and an open port number [14].  
The databases were tested according to their supported authentication methods. This is the 
only feature that is available in all reviewed solutions, yet it is disabled by default in all of them. 
Redis offers authentication via the auth command, yet we found that it sends the password 
unencrypted. Authentication must be enabled in the configuration file.  
Authentication in Cassandra is configured within the configuration file using the 
authenticator setting. There are two options, the AllowAllAuthenticator (allows all connections, 
does not require authentication) and the PasswordAuthenticator (requires user credentials to 
allow a connection). To be able to use Cassandras permission system, authentication must be 
enabled. 
Supported authentication mechanisms in MongoDB are SCRAM-SHA-1 (challenge-
response authentication, per-user random salts, SHA-1 usage, client to server and server to 
client authentication), MONGODB-CR (verifies unencrypted user credentials against a user’s 
name, password and the authentication database) and x.509 certificate authentication (requires 
secure TLS connection) [21].  
In OrientDB one must be authenticated to a server instance to run certain commands like 
list databases or create database, while for other commands (e.g. create user) one must be 




Passwords were tested according to where they are stored and in what form and if there are 
some built in functions to help creating secure passwords in the first place.  
In Redis the password is set by the system administrator in clear text inside the unencrypted 
configuration file. Cassandra stores the password encrypted within a system table. The 
PasswordAuthenticator queries the table for the hashed password, a salt is not used. 
In MongoDB passwords are created with a per-user random salt and a hash function (SHA-
1). Alternatively, certificates can be used. Many applications still rely on SHA-1, even though 
it has been broken in practice [5]. Risk due to not changing the default superuser and password 
in the context of MongoDB were documented in [10]. In this particular incident, Niall Merrigan, 
a security researcher and Microsoft developer, used Shodan.io to pin down the number of 
MongoDB installations at risk and came up with a number close to 52,000 servers that are 
accessible from the internet without authentication [10].   
 
                              Fig. 2. Part of the OrientDB configuration file 
 
In OrientDB the password for the server user is saved within the configuration file as a 
hash. The database user’s password is saved as a hash within the OUser table. The used 
algorithm is PBKDF2, the number of iterations to generate the salt can be set as a parameter.  
PBKDF2 has a reported design flaw wherein the performance is lowered because in order to 
produce outputs of any size, PBKDF2 hashes each block of output all over [16]. 
Most RDBMSs offer more than one form of authentication, often including external 
authentication such as OS-based approaches (e.g. Windows authentication in Microsoft SQL 
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Server). Some other noteworthy options are Kerberos authentication, where information is 
exchanged over an open network by assigning a ticket (unique key) to a user; Lightweight 
Directory Access Protocol (LDAP), which uses a centralized directory database to store 
information about users in a hierarchical manner; Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), which uses 
a private and a public key for the authentication process; Transport Layer Security (TLS), which 
transmit the authentication information over the network in encrypted form; digital cards or 
smart cards, which require a card reader; and a device called a digital token, which provides a 
new pin as password for every authentication action [1]. Kerberos and LDAP functionalities 
are only offered in the enterprise editions of MongoDB and OrientDB. 
 
Securing communication 
The network poses a significant security issue, as it links together all clients and servers. 
Network security should provide data integrity and confidentiality, while also protecting data 
in transit from disruption. According to [13], network security can be segmented into encrypting 
data streams, providing integrity checks and limiting access to certain networks and servers to 
authorized persons. In terms of sever security authentication to the server instance, getting rid 
of default configurations, paying particular attention to configuration files and enabling logging 
was researched in our lab for the systems chosen.  
Redis’ default operating mode is the so called protected mode, which allows only 
connections from loopback, as it is supposed to be accessed by trusted clients in trusted 
environments only. Redis is optimized for performance and simplicity. But it is not for security, 
as Salvatore Sanfilippo - developer of Redis - states [19]. The Redis security model is: “... 
totally insecure to let untrusted clients access the system, please protect it from the outside 
world yourself. The reason is that, basically, 99.99% of the Redis use cases are inside a 
sandboxed environment. […] Adding security features adds complexity” [19]. At least 
authentication can be configured. 
TLS can be enabled in all solutions, except Redis, to encrypt traffic between database 
servers and clients as well as between nodes within a cluster if one is using Cassandra. This 
will be discussed further for all solutions in the section “Encryption”. Figure 3 shows the 
configuration of client encryption in Cassandra. 
 
Fig. 3. Configuration of client encryption in Cassandra 
OrientDB allows for security settings like disabling clickjacking, a malicious technique of 
tricking a web user into clicking on something different from what the user perceives they are 
clicking on, thus revealing confidential information or taking control of their computer. This 
can be done by setting the additional header X-FRAME-OPTIONS to DENY in all the HTTP 
responses. To enable it, one must set a couple of additional headers in orientdb-server-
config.xml under the HTTP listener XML tag: 
 











Different types of data should be kept confidential and preferably encrypted. Even though an 
authorized person might access the data, sensitive data such as passwords should remain 
confidential. We did investigate if the databases offer any form of encryption at all. In doing so 
we focused on data-at-rest and data-in-transit.  
Redis offers no data-in-transit encryption as well as no data-at-rest encryption. Redis Labs 
again puts a strong emphasis on the fact that Redis is supposed to be accessed by trusted clients 
inside trusted environments only.  
Cassandra provides data-in-transit encryption between client machine and database cluster, 
as well as between nodes within a cluster. Supported protocols and cipher suites are configured 
in the configuration file, were the disabled encryption must be enabled first (figure 4). 
Cassandra additionally offers materialized views to secure individual rows and columns and to 
mask values and remove personally identifiable information. Data-at-rest encryption must be 
enabled and currently covers only two kind of files, “commitlog” (to avoid data loss and to keep 
recent changes in memory) and “hint” (if a node is down, writes missed are stored there for a 
period of time).  
 
 
Fig. 4. Configuration of client encryption Cassandra 
MongoDB encrypts data-in-transit via TLS, while data-at-rest encryption is not available 
in the community edition. It should not go unmentioned that MongoDB offers collection-level 
access control by creating a role that is specific to a collection in a particular database, meaning 
that a user’s privileges are limited to a specific collection. This is the finest-grained restriction 
that MongoDB offers, but there is also a way to further restrict access to documents. Field-level 
redaction restricts the contents of a document based on information stored in the document 
itself. Multiple access levels for the same data are enabled via an access field, best set to an 
array of arrays. Each array element contains a required set of tags that a user needs to have to 
be allowed to access the data. 
OrientDB offers security of data-in-transit via TLS and security of data-at-rest through 
encryption with either AES or DES algorithm. The encryption key is not saved to the database 
but must be provided at run-time. It is possible to create an encrypted database through the Java 
API or the console. Using the encryption option together with the create database command is 
only possible after setting the encryption key through the config command, as shown in figure 
5. 
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Fig. 5. Create encrypted database within OrientDB 
There is also the possibility to manage security at record-level which allows the developer 
to apply a fine access control and security permissions to single records of a class, through 
which only authorized users are granted access to restricted records. To activate record-level 
security, classes must extend the ORestricted super-class. Information about authorization on 
each record is stored in special fields. Figure 6 shows the activated record-level security, while 
figure 7 shows how the records look to an authorized user. 
 
 
Fig. 6. User can only access one record 
 
Fig. 7. All available records 
Auditing  
“There is no security without audit, and there is no need to audit without the need for security” 
[15]. Collecting information about security-relevant events such as operations on privileges, 
schemas, objects and statements, and analysing it can help to identify security gaps or issues 
with configurations in general.  
Redis offers the monitor command which should show commands processed by the server, 
but it does not only reduce the throughput significantly, it also does not monitor important 
commands such as changes in the configuration, which makes it unusable for a complete 
auditing approach. 
Cassandra, MongoDB and OrientDB offer no valuable out of the box auditing, although it 
is mentioned in Cassandra’s documentation that audit log features could be added in a future 





The purpose of log management is the central collection, transmission, storage, analysis and 
forwarding of log data. Our research focused on the question, to what level the provided logging 
commands are a usable and safe way of logging database actions.  
Lab research showed that log management was either not supported at all or offered in a 
very basic form. Redis offers logging of basic information such as uptime in seconds, memory 
used and number of connected clients with the info command to the console as well as to an 
unencrypted file.  
In Cassandra the monitoring possibilities mostly focus on performance which gives a good 
overview of the status of the cluster.  In MongoDB the server activity as well as diagnostic 
information are logged but the server activity log is not encrypted. OrientDB offers logging to 
the console as well as to an unencrypted file. 
4. Summary 
In summary, the analysis at hand clearly shows that all databases provide password-based 
client-side authentication which is always disabled by default. Cassandra and OrientDB offer 
default super-users with default passwords which is a security problem. Server to server 
authentication is done through TLS and shared key-file approaches. Role-based authorization 
is implemented at a basic level in all solutions except for Redis. Support for custom defined 
roles is offered in all four database systems. The scope of role-based access rights varies. 
The security of backups, data-at-rest and monitoring seem to be accountable to the database 
owner. Many security weaknesses arise from default configurations, including setting up a 
database with no password at all or default users with default passwords, no role and permission 
management, ports without protection and accepting connections from all clients. Secure access 
to a database requires a client to authenticate to the server and thus to verify identity. Server 
authentication, role-based security, role options, the scope of roles, database security and 
logging are all important factors that significantly simplify security administration and 
operations. 
In the following tables, the reader can find a systematic listing of all our results. 
 
Common abbreviations  
BI Built-in roles  CR Custom roles NS Not Supported 
DIS Disabled by default Dit Data-in-transit Dar Data-at-rest 
 
Table 1.  User administration and authorization 
DB Name User administration Authorization 
Redis NS NS 
Cassandra default user Role-based, BI, CR, inheritance 
MongoDB no default user  DIS, role-based, BI, CR, multiple roles per user, inheritance 
OrientDB set of default users, LDAP import of users and roles 
Role-based, BI, CR, multiple roles 
per user, inheritance 
 
Table 2. Authentication and password security 
DB Name Authentication Password security 
Redis DIS, custom user/password Clear text, sent unencrypted 
Cassandra DIS, custom user/password, super user 
Default password for admin 
user, stored encrypted 
MongoDB DIS, custom user/password, X509, SCRAM-SHA-1, 
Per-user random salt, strong 
hash function 
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MongoDB-CR and TLS 
OrientDB DIS, admin user per database, custom user/password and TLS 
Default password for admin 
user, stored encrypted 
Table 3. Server security and encryption 
DB Name Server security Encryption 
Redis 
since v3.2 protected mode: only 
connections from loopback 
accepted  
Dit: NS; Dar: NS 
Cassandra All settings disabled by default, TLS configurable 
Dit: DIS, via TLS; Dar: DIS, 
limited support 
MongoDB All settings disabled by default, TLS configurable Dit: DIS, via TLS; Dar: NS 
OrientDB Server-side scripting disabled, TLS configurable 
Dit: DIS, via TLS; Dar: DIS, 
AES & DES 
Table 4. Data security and Log management 
DB Name Data security Audit Log management 
Redis NS NS 
Basic functionalities 
through info and 
monitor command 
Cassandra Encryption of Dit and Dar; Materialized views NS 
Event logging, focus on 
performance metrics 
MongoDB 
Encryption of Dit, collection-
level access control via 
specific role, field-level 
reduction based on 
information within document 
NS 
Server activity, 




Encryption of Dit and Dar; 
record-level via ORestricted 
super-class 
NS 
logging to the console 
or unencrypted file  
5. Conclusion and future work 
This work shows that for the four NoSQL database systems investigated, development is at the 
moment not primarily focused on the implementation of security features. The systems have 
reduced out of the box security functionality, some standard security concepts are completely 
missing. The obvious result is that for these systems database administrators and developers 
must be aware of the limitations in terms of security, as well as of the potential consequences 
of using these systems outside of their intended environment. 
To mitigate the effects of the known security issues we advise to enable security 
features that are disabled by default, to evaluate default configurations like database password 
settings, protection of ports and accepted client connections; to deactivate default users with 
default passwords; to take care of data-at-rest encryption and to make use of user and role 
management if available. 
Our findings also provide further motivation for our team to increase our current efforts 
to finish a systematic map of out of the box NoSQL security. Such a map will give users and 
organizations a hint on NoSQL systems having security advantages over other systems. Such a 
ranking will hopefully motivate vendors to invest into the security features of their systems. We 
have already defined two additional sets of NoSQL Systems to research for out of the box 
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security. We plan to publish a first version of our NoSQL security map when these research 
results are available. Final activities will be the completion of this map, and afterwards keeping 
it permanently up to date. 
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